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Abstract: Recent advances in information technologies create numerous opportunities for
retailers to turn customer information into additional prots by targeted pricing: charging dif-
ferent prices to dierent market segments based on customer demographic variables. However,
rigorous theoretical analysis regarding what is the prot-maximizing set of variables remains
scarce. This study develops a game-theoretic model to investigate this question. Results of this
model suggest that a monopoly seller should use pricing variables with high explanatory power
of its demand: i.e., variables with large demand coecient or high variance. In the duopoly case,
this model suggests that the value of price discrimination is the same as that in the monopoly
case when only one rm uses that pricing variable. When two symmetric rms simultaneously
use a pricing variable, the value of price discrimination may be higher or lower. When two
rms sell substitutes and the demand is aected by that variable in the same direction, VOPD
is higher. In contrast, when the demand is aected by that variable in the opposite direction,
VOPD is lower. When rms sell complements, these eects are reversed. This model is applied
to horizontal dierentiation and vertical dierentiation to explain the puzzle that in practice
similar products are often priced based on dierent variables.
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1 Introduction
In the Internet age, retailers are privileged in knowing what products customers buy, at what
price, and the demographic variables of each customers. The question is how retailers should use
this information. Recent advances in information technologies create numerous opportunities to
turn customer information into additional prots. For example, business intelligence software
can rank customers, and identify and prioritize the best segments based on customer information.
Firms began by including targeted messaging on webpages, emails, and catalogues with a cus-
tomer's preferred products and special oers. In a recent Yankee Group survey, 48 percent of the
456 respondents said they currently use technology to manage pricing. Meanwhile, 25 percent
plan to buy technology in the next 12 months to provide customer-specic pricing electronically.
This is because pricing software generates an impressive ROI, typically 5 to 19 percent prot
improvement (source: www.cio.com). However, rigorous theoretical analysis regarding what is
the optimal set of demographic variables sellers should use for price discrimination and/or mar-
ket segmentation remains scarce. When it is unclear which set of demographic variables the
sellers should use to create market segments, eorts to reach customers and improve customer
protability will fall at.
Behind the fancy names such as targeted pricing, targeted couponing, and promotion manage-
ment is a long-existing economic concept: price discrimination. The selection of pricing variables
is crucial for any price discrimination strategies. Surprisingly, existing literature focuses only the
price points but not the variables on which the prices based. Paradoxical phenomenon exists
even in the most conventional, daily price discrimination scenarios. For example, stores around
a university all have the following options of price discrimination strategies: (1) no discounts at
all; (2) discounts to only students (with student ID); (3) discounts to everyone who works in
that university (with university ID); (4) issuing coupons to passengers on the street; (5) coupons
to returning/loyal customers; (6) restaurants or stores may charge higher prices to university
sta because of convenience. All of these strategies coexist around any university in the United
States. However, to the best of my knowledge, a thorough analysis of this phenomenon has not
been provided in the literature.
A high-tech version of this story occurs in the enterprise software industry: similar products
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or even the same product in dierent generations are priced based on dierent variables. For
example, most of the software products are charged based on the (concurrent) number of users
or computers. At the same time, IBM mainframes have been priced based on the horsepower of
CPUs for years. Sun Microsystems' Java Enterprise System has been priced by the size of the
purchasing company's sta. Databases have been priced by the number of CPUs. Once Oracle,
the most powerful database vendor, experimented for two years with licensing based on the total
processing power of CPUs, but abandoned the new pricing scheme after Oracle 9i. Since the
variable cost of these software products is zero, these practices are price discrimination examples
in essence. Without the understanding of the underlying trade-os, even a dominant, hundred-
billion dollar company, such as Oracle, may incur huge loss due to failed pricing experiment.
The pricing variables selection problem has much wider applicability than these two examples.
Online brokers, such as eTrade, can charge customers based on the number or dollar amount of
transactions. eBay charges auction sellers by a complicated function of initial and nal prices.
Rental cars can be charged based on actual mileage, prepaid mileage, or the length of rental
time. The same seat of the same ight may be sold from $200 to $1000 based on a variety of
factors. Digitized books/music/movies can be sold based on the number of concurrent users
(or computers), the number of times that the le can be used (usage), or the length of the
ownership. Online DVD rental rms Netix and Blockbuster charge users based on the number
of DVD rented at the same time or the total number rented in a month.
Motivated by burgeoning applications, this study attempts to answer the following research
questions: (1) How should rm(s) choose pricing variables in a monopoly (or duopoly)? (2)
How does competition aect the variables selection problem? (2) Under what conditions will
rms benet from pricing based on the same variable? In the database example, since the most
powerful vendor cannot unilaterally changed the pricing variable, it is possible that pricing based
on the same variable is an equilibrium in that case. The present study conrms this conjecture.
At the rst sight, this fact seems to contradict the intuition that rms can relax price competition
by using dierent variables. This study will address these issues and provide the conditions under
which each pricing strategy prole can be an equilibrium.
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1.1 Overview of Results
This paper investigates this problem by using a third-degree price discrimination model. Ex-
amples in the introduction are typical third-degree price discrimination.2 This study models
consumer demand using a general linear demand system, which encompasses models with hori-
zontal or vertical dierentiation. Specically, the demand of each rm is assumed to be a linear
combination of pricing variables and prices. No distributional assumption is imposed on the
pricing variables except assuming zero correlation between any two variables. The sequence of
the game is as follows: risk-neutral rms rst select pricing variables simultaneously and then
choose pricing functions simultaneously second.
In the benchmarking monopoly case, this model suggests that the optimal pricing plan is
a linear function of the pricing variables (a two-part tari). The additional value of using a
pricing variable depends only on three factors: (1) the monopoly power (2) the variance of that
variable (3) the coecient of that variable in the demand function. Interestingly, this value of
price discrimination (VOPD) does not depend on the mean of each variable. Therefore, it is
optimal for the monopoly seller to use pricing variables with high explanatory power of its own
demand: i.e., variables with large coecients or high variance. In other words, this \variance
reduction" criterion is similar to selecting independent variables for a linear regression on rm
demands. It is worth noting that, unlike linear regression, the goal of this model is to maximize
expected rm prot rather than to minimize mean-squared error. Nevertheless, the optimal rule
of selecting variables is the same. This model also suggests a simple index for estimating the
percentage of revenue improvement. Without this index, marketing managers can estimate the
revenue gain only via expensive pricing experiments.
2Second-degree price discrimination occurs when prices dier depending on the number of units of
the good bought, but not across consumers (Varian (1992)). Third-degree price discrimination means
that dierent purchasers are charged dierent prices, but each purchaser pays a constant amount for
each unit of the good bought (Varian (1992)).
In some of the motivational examples, buyers can change their pricing variables, which is a second-
degree price discrimination problem. For example, rms can change the number of employees to save
software expenses. However, few rms adopt this strategy in practice. In the extreme, even student
status is "adjustable" by getting a fake ID or registering for a class. But, few people will act this way
to get student discounts. Hence, results of this papers still apply well in examples when buyers do not
change their characteristics because of the pricing plan.
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In the duopoly case, this model suggest that the VOPD is the same as that in the monopoly
case when only one rm uses that pricing variable. When two symmetric rms use a pricing
variable at the same time, the VOPD may be higher or lower. When two rms sell substitutes
and the demand is aected by that variable in the same direction, VOPD is higher. The reason is
that price discrimination based on the same pricing variable can better coordinate rms' pricing
strategies to relax competition. In contrast, when the demand is aected by that variable in the
opposite direction, VOPD is lower. The intuition is similar to the literature in targeted pricing,
in which price discrimination will trigger price war in each rm's strong/loyal market segments,
leading to lower equilibrium VOPD. When rms sell complements, these eects are reversed.
This paper provides two stylized applications to horizontal dierentiation and vertical dif-
ferentiation. In the rst case, it is shown that pricing based on the same variable will damage
the VOPD. In the vertical dierentiation case, this study shows that the low quality rm has
stronger incentive to use variables that aect only the willingness-to-pay of customers whereas
the high quality rm has stronger incentive to use variables that aect only the quality preference
of customers. In both cases, this model suggests that multiple Nash equilibria is the norm rather
than the exception, providing one convincing explanation of why similar products are priced
based on dierent variables in practice.
1.2 Relevant Literature
This paper adds to the existing literature in several important aspects. First, to the best of my
knowledge, this study is the rst to investigate the pricing variables selection problem, which
is crucial to the success of a fundamental marketing problem: pricing. As discussed in the
introduction, in the digital age, the variable costs of more and more products are becoming
negilible, leading to more new pricing plans and wider selection of pricing variables. At the
same time, industrial environment becomes more volatile, the new pricing plans become more
short-lived and it is also more costly to nd optimal pricing plans by market experiments. A
theoretical model can greatly save the time and eorts of practitioners to nd the new pricing
plans that use most protable pricing variables.
Second, the present paper complements the existing literature that studies the value of de-
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mand information in a duopoly model (Bertrand-Nash pricing game). When rms use a variable,
they can charge dierent prices in dierent market segments, which is similar to charging dif-
ferent prices based on signals of market demand conditions. It has been shown in the seminal
work of Vives (1984) that in a duopoly model where rms have private information about an
uncertain linear demand, if the goods are substitutes, to share information is a dominant strategy
for each rm in Bertrand competition with known cost structures. If the goods are complements,
the result is reversed. Along this line, numerous papers have investigated the conditions under
which oligopolists have an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or
stochastic costs (e.g., Sakai (1985), Gal-Or (1985), Gal-Or (1986), Shapiro (1986), Ziv (1993),
Raith (1996)). Similar approaches have been used to investigate the value of marketing infor-
mation (Raju and Roy (2000)), information sharing in a supply chain contracting context (Lee
et al. (2000), Li (2002)), and sharing security information (Gal-Or and Ghose (2005)).
In terms of the model setup, the present paper mostly resembles Sasaki (2001), in which the
author uses a duopoly model where the intercept of linear demands is uncertain to show that
in a Bertrand market with substitute products, one rm's information acquisition increases the
other rm's incentive to acquire the same information. The present model is dierent in several
important aspects: rst, the present paper studies the equilibrium pricing variables selection,
which has not been explored in the literature. Second, this stream of literature (except Sasaki
(2001)) focused on multivariate normally distributed noise and signals. The current model does
not impose any distributional assumptions on the pricing variables. Moreover, the information
structure is completely dierent because this paper considers more than one pricing variable.
Third, pricing variables may aect market demand in the opposite direction, which is not cap-
tured in the previous literature.
This paper adds to the theoretical pricing literature: particularly third-degree price dis-
crimination models. This stream of literature in economics started from the seminal article of
Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985), and has focused only on the welfare implications of price
discrimination but not on the variables selection problem. In the marketing literature, researchers
have investigated applications of price discrimination such as pricing based on purchase history
(Villas-Boas (1999), Villas-Boas (2004), and Acquisti and Varian (2005)), spatial/targeted pric-
ing (e.g., Thisse and Vives (1989), Shaer and Zhang (2000), Corts (1998), Chen et al. (2001),
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Chen and Iyer (2002), Choudhary et al. (2005), Liu and Zhang (2006)), and targeted couponing
(e.g., Shaer and Zhang (1995), Shaer and Zhang (2002)). The focus of these studies is to
investigate the impacts of various pricing strategies on the protability of rms. The present
model bridges the gap between these models and business practices by explicitly modeling many
pricing variables instead of one theoretical, abstract variable such as \customer type," \purchase
history," \brand loyalty," \location/taste" in spatial models, and \quality preference" in vertical
dierentiation models.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the setup and the results of the baseline
model. Section 3 discusses the equilibrium variables selection and its applications. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 4.
2 Model
There are two sellers A and B competing in many market segments determined by a set of pricing
variables. Pricing variables are denoted by an N -dimensional random vector with coordinates
denoted by Xi and realizations denoted by xi: For example, Xi can be a binary variable, such
as student status or a continuous variable such as the income of end-consumers or the nancial
statistics of a corporate buyer. The mean and variance of each variable are denoted by i and
2i , respectively. One neat property of this model is that no distributional assumption is imposed
on the pricing variables except the correlation coecient between any two variables is assumed
to be zero.3 There are two stages of this game: (1) two sellers announce their choices of pricing
variables simultaneously; (2) two sellers announce pricing in each market segment simultaneously.
The solution concept is subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium.
This study models consumer demand for these two brands using the linear demand system,
a model that has been used frequently in the literature. Formally, the demand of buyers with a
3If pricing variables are not orthogonal to each other, theoretically, we can apply principal component
analysis to nd the new coordinates for this pricing problem.
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demographic value vector (x1;   xN) has the following linear functional form.
DA(x1;   xN ; pA; pB) = 0 +
NX
i=1
ixi   ApA(x1;   xN) + BpB(x1;   xN);
DB(x1;   xN ; ; pA; pB) = 0 +
NX
i=1
ixi + ApA(x1;   xN)  BpB(x1;   xN):
where the subscripts of demand and prices denote the seller A and B, i and i are exogenous
coecients of variables, and pA() and pB() are product prices in each market segment. Note
that A and B are positive and other coecients can be either positive or negative. Cross
price coecients, B and A; are both positive when two products are substitutes and both
negative when two products are complements. This linear demand system encompasses models
with vertical or horizontal dierentiation in the literature. Applications will discussed in detail
in Section 3.
For ease of exposition, I use XA and XB to denote the random vectors of variables used by
seller A and B, respectively. In the following analysis, the realizations of XA and XB are denoted
by xA and xB. Note that XA and XB can have an empty intersection set or not. For example,
XA may include two variables (region, student status) and XB may include (region, gender).
Both rms are risk neutral and maximize expected prots conditional on the pricing variables.
The variable costs are assumed to be zero to simplify the notations. All of the results still hold
with constant variable cost. Given this setup, when rm A uses XA; the expected revenue in
each market segment is a function of xA and is given by
RA(xA) = pA(xA)E [DA(x1;   xN jxA)] :
This model also considers xed costs of price discrimination. In real-world pricing problems,
there exist various kinds of costs associated with implementing price discrimination. First, sellers
have to buy or collect customer information. In the next phase, sellers incur administrative costs
such as menu costs, accounting costs, and pricing variables tracking costs. Price discrimination
may also impose heavy (psychological) costs on the buyers arising from concerns about unfair-
ness, aversion to complicated pricing plans, and mental costs of price discrimination by some
controversial attributes.4 This paper models these costs by a constant number Fi associated
4A model of unfairness should aect the demand of each market segment, which might be an inter-
esting topic for future research but is beyond the scope of this paper.
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with each variable Xi:
Since xed costs do not aect the second stage pricing game, sellers will choose a pricing
function pi() among all possible functions to maximize revenues in each market segment. The
total prot can be derived by taking expectation over XA or XB: Results are reported in the
following sections.
2.1 Monopoly Benchmark Case
We rst consider a monopoly benchmark case. Assuming only rm A serves the whole market,
the optimal price and prot are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 When rm A uses variable XA in a monopoly industry, the optimal price and revenue
function is given by
pA(xA) =
1
2A
"
A +
X
i2A
i(xi   i)
#
;
A =
1
4A
 
2A +
X
i2A
2i
2
i
!
 
X
i2A
Fi;
where A =
NX
i=1
ii: (expected intercept)
There are several important implications from this lemma. First, the optimal pricing function
is a linear function of pricing variables, which is chosen among any possible pricing functions. In
other words, the seller should use a simple pricing plan: charge customers a xed fee A
2A
and
a variable (usage) fee i
2A
. For example, eBay can charge their sellers a xed listing fee at A
2A
:
The interpretation of i
2A
depends on the pricing variable: it is a per unit fee when "the number
of items sold" is the variable, or a percentage (commission) when the nal auction price is the
pricing variable. Note that this result is built upon the linear demand but not the distribution
of pricing variables.
As to the revenue function, this model suggests a simple criterion for the monopoly seller
to select pricing variables. First, the seller can consider the adoption of variables one-by-one
because there is no multiplicative, interaction term in the revenue function. This nice property
results from the zero correlation and the linearity of demands assumptions. Second and most
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important of all, the criterion for selecting variables is to compare
2i 
2
i
4A
with Fi: The value of
price discrimination (VOPD) from using variable Xi is
2i 
2
i
4A
, which implies variables with large
coecient (2i ) or large variance (
2
i ) should be used for price discriminating/market segmenta-
tion. The impact of A on VOPD is intuitive: the larger the A, the lower the monopoly market
power is and thus the VOPD is lower.
Lastly, the improvement of revenue can be estimated by a simple formula, 2i
2
i =
2
A; which
is similar to the squared coecient of variation (=) in statistics. Firms can easily evaluate
the marginal contribution of each pricing variable by calculating this number. Intuitively, 2i
2
i
represents the explained variations or the source of VOPD while 2A is the normalization factor
as in the coecient of variation.
2.2 Duopoly Results
In the duopoly case, the equilibrium prices are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose 0 and 0 are large enough so that no market segment is closed for each rm
in the equilibrium. When rms A and B use variables XA and XB, respectively, the equilibrium
prices are
pA(xA) = A1 +
X
i2AnB
i
2A
(xi   i) +
X
i2A\B
A2i(xi   i);
pB(xB) = B1 +
X
i2BnA
i
2B
(xi   i) +
X
i2A\B
B2i(xi   i);
where A1 =
2BA + BB
4AB   BA
and B1 =
2AB + AA
4AB   BA
;
A2i =
Bi + 2Bi
4AB   BA
; (1)
B2i =
2Ai + Ai
4AB   BA
; (2)
A 
X
i2

ii and B 
X
i2

ii:
This lemma indicates that equilibrium prices are still linear functions of pricing variables but
now it has three components. The rst term is a constant term. The second term is a linear
function of pricing variables used by rm A but not rm B (or the other way around). Note that
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this term is exactly the same as that in the monopoly case. The third term is a linear function
of pricing variables used by both rms. Note that these pricing functions are mean-preserving
dispersions along that dimension. For example, suppose only rm A uses X1; then rm B is
facing an expected price E[pA(X1)] = pA(E[X1]); which is the price charged by rm A when rm
A does not use X1: This feature leads to the result that the second component is the same as
that in the monopoly case. The following Theorem also shows that this feature leads to the same
VOPD when only one rm uses a pricing variable in the duopoly case.
Theorem 1 When rms A and B use variables XA and XB respectively, the equilibrium revenues
are
A =
0@AA21 + X
i2AnB
2i
4A
 2i + A
X
i2A\B
A22i  2i
1A X
i2A
Fi; (3)
B =
0@BB21 + X
i2BnA
2i
4B
 2i + B
X
i2A\B
B22i  2i
1A X
i2B
Fi: (4)
Similar to the equilibrium price functions, the rst component in the bracket, A21 or B
2
1 ,
depends on the product dierentiation and rm competition but not on the selection of pricing
variables. The second component is
2i
4A
 2i (or 
2
i
4B
 2i ) which is the VOPD when only one
rm uses variable Xi. This value is exactly the same as that in the monopoly case. Intuitively,
when only one rm uses a variable, the other rm's pricing along that dimension will be the
same as shown in Lemma 2. Since the opponent will not react to the pricing policy change, the
equilibrium VOPD is the same as that in the monopoly case. The last component represents the
VOPD when both rms use Xi. The expression of this coecient depends on several parameters
and is more complicated. The next section will discuss special cases and shed more lights on this
term.
Theorem 1 also suggests that the revenue and cost from pricing based on each variable do
not have interaction terms (i.e., there is no multiplicative term of any two variables). In other
words, each rm's optimal response can be greatly simplied. In this game, each rm has to
consider 2N possible variables selections and the payo matrix is a 2N -by-2N matrix. With the
independence property, this game can be decomposed into N 2-by-2 payo matrix. A typical
payo matrix is illustrated in Table 1. In the following analysis, I shall use the notation (?; Xi)
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(Additional Prot) Firm B uses Xi Firm B does not use Xi
Firm A uses Xi AA
2
2i
2
i F i; BB22i2i F i 
2
i
4A
2i F i; 0
Firm A does not use Xi 0;
2i
4B
2i F i 0; 0
Table 1: Equilibrium Additional Prots from Pricing Based on Xi
to denote the equilibrium in which the rst element ? means rm A does not use Xi and the
second element Xi means rm B uses Xi:
Corollary 1 This 2N -by-2N variables selection game is equivalent to N 2-by-2 single variable
selection game.
3 Equilibrium Variables Selection
In the general case presented in the previous section, all variable selections are possible in the
equilibrium. To shed more lights on the new research questions, it is necessary to put some
restrictions on the parameters. This section considers two cases: (1) the symmetric case and (2)
the rm-specic variable case (pricing variables aect only one rm's demand). Following each
case, I will provide a stylized example to highlight key ndings.
3.1 Symmetric Case
This paper denes symmetric rms by assuming i = i; A = B; and B = A: It is worth
mention that when i = i; a pricing variable aects both rms' demand in the same direction
with the same magnitude. In other words, this type of variables identies what is the market
segment that has higher demand for both rms' products. In contrast, when i =  i; a pricing
variable aects the duopoly demand in the opposite direction with the same magnitude. For
example, in the case of Netix and Blockbuster, some customers used to rent a DVD online
whereas the others used to rent a DVD oine depending on where they lived or the convenience
of their Internet access.
These symmetric assumptions greatly reduce the complexity of the equilibrium results. By
Theorem 1 and Table 1, there are only three regions of NEs depending on the value of xed cost,
12
Fi. When the xed cost is very high (or very low), it is a dominant strategy for both rms not
to use (or to use) variable Xi. There are only two subcases in the intermediate region and the
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (1) When Fi=
2
i  max[AA22i; 
2
i
4A
]; the unique NE is (?;?).
(2) When min[AA
2
2i;
2i
4A
]  Fi=2i  max[AA22i; 
2
i
4A
];
(2-1) There are two NEs: either (?;?) or (Xi; Xi) is an equilibrium when two products are
substitutes (B = A > 0), and Xi aects the demand functions in the same direction (i = i);
or when two products are complement goods (B = A < 0), and Xi aects the demand functions
in the opposite direction.
(2-2) There are two NEs: either (?; Xi) or (Xi;?) is an equilibrium when two products are sub-
stitutes (B = A > 0), and Xi aects the demand functions in the opposite direction (i =  i);
or when two products are complement goods (B = A < 0), and Xi aects the demand functions
in the same direction.
(3) When Fi=
2
i  min[AA22i; 
2
i
4A
]; the unique NE is (Xi; Xi).
Cases (1) and (3) are intuitive since Fi=
2
i measures the cost/benet in this model. The
intuition of (2-1) is as follows: when only rm A price discriminates on Xi, rm A will raise its
price in the strong market. If rm B does not use Xi, it will keep its price at the original level,
which will drag down rm A's price because of product competition. When rm B also uses
Xi; rm B will also raise its price in rm A's strong market, which will further elevate rm A's
equilibrium price in the strong market because these two products are substitutes. As a result,
the equilibrium prices will be more dispersed when both rms use Xi compared with the case
in which only rm A uses Xi: Since the revenue is a quadratic function of equilibrium prices,
the more dispersed the price is, the higher the equilibrium revenue is.5 In other words, this type
of variable can coordinate the pricing strategy of a duopoly. A duopoly will raise prices in a
protable market and lower prices in a non-protable market. The gain in the protable market
5Recall that the equilibrium price is a mean-preserving function of the equilibrium uniform price. In
other words, the equilibrium prices always have the same mean no matter which the metrics are chosen
by rms A or B. Also, the equilibrium revenue is equal to the squared prices. By Jensen's inequality,
the more dispersed the equilibrium prices are, the higher the equilibrium revenue will be.
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will dominate the loss in the weak market, leading to higher equilibrium revenue. For example,
suppose two rms identify a market segment that is very lucrative. If only rm A raises prices in
that market, rm A cannot improve prots signicantly because of rm B's low price. If rm B
also raises price in that segment, then both rms can benet from relaxing competition in that
segment and earn more prots in the equilibrium.
In contrast, when the variable aects demand functions in the opposite direction as in (2-
2), rm B will lower its price in rm A's strong market when both rms use Xi: As a result,
the equilibrium prices will be less dispersed when both rms use Xi compared with the case in
which only rm A use Xi: This intuition is similar to the idea explored in marketing literature
that targeted pricing or targeted coupons may lead to lower equilibrium prots. The case of
complements is also interesting. The equilibrium eects are reversed because the best response
of rms has dierent directional eects when the other rm raises or lowers prices. For example,
when both rms useXi; rm B still raises prices in rm A's strong market segments. However, the
higher prices of rm B put pressure on rm A's pricing because two products are complements
(e.g., if the inkjet is already expensive, printer cannot be too expensive). As a result, the
equilibrium price will be lower rather than higher as in the substitutes case.
3.2 Application: Horizontal Dierentiation
There are two sellers A and B selling horizontally dierentiated products. For example, rm A
can be Blockbuster and rm B can be Netix.com. There are two pricing variables, X1 and X2.
Customers are grouped into several market segments based on these two demographic variables.
X1 indicates how far a customer lives from a Blockbuster's store. X2 indicates wether or not a
customer likes to shop online. In each market, there are two sellers A and B located at the two
ends of a straight line [ 1; 1]. The utility function of a buyer located at x with demographic
values (x1, x2) to buy from each seller is assumed to be
UA = K   1
2
[x  ( 1)]  pA;
UB = K   1
2
(1  x)  pB;
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(Additional Prot) Firm B uses Xi Firm B does not use Xi
Firm A uses Xi
1
9
2i F i; 192i F i 2i F i; 0
Firm A does not use Xi 0; 
2
i F i 0; 0
Table 2: Equilibrium Additional Prots from Pricing Based on Xi
where K is a constant large enough so that every customer buys from either rm A or B; x is
the location of that customer and is uniformly distributed in [X1+X2  12 ; X1+X2+ 12 ]:6 It can
be veried that traveling cost does aect the results and thus is assumed to be 1/2 for simplicity.
Given this setup, it follows that the demand of each rm in each market segment is
DA =  X1  X2 + 1
2
  pA + pB;
DB = X1 +X2 +
1
2
+ pA   pB:
Compared with the baseline model, it follows that 1 =  1, 1 =  1, 2 = 1, 2 = 1, and
A = B = A = B = 1: By Theorem (1), the payo matrices of using X1 and X2 are given in
Table 2.
When only one rm uses either X1 or X2; the value of price discrimination is
1
4
21:When both
rms uses X1, the value of price discrimination is
1
9
21: This comes from the targeted pricing
eect discussed in Section 3. As a result, with moderate xed costs of price discrimination, only
one rm should use a specic type of discounting (price discrimination) in the equilibrium. Note
that there are multiple equilibria of the full game: (1) rm A uses X1 and X2; (2) rm B uses
X1 and X2; (1) rm A uses X1 and rm B uses X2; (2) rm B uses X1 and rm A uses X2.
This partly explains why it is easy to nd inconsistent pricing variables for similar products in
practice. In the real world, if there are additional xed costs associated with the number of
pricing variables, then only cases (3) and (4) are feasible, in which each rm uses dierent types
of discounting strategy to avoid price competition.
6X1 X2  12   1 and X1+X2+ 12  1 are assumed to hold in all market segments in this example.
All other assumptions in Section 2 still apply here.
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3.3 Firm Specic Variable Case
This section considers the case in which only one rm's demand is aected by a variable. Formally,
let i > 0 and i = 0: Again, by Theorem 1 and Table 1, the equilibrium results can be derived
and are summarized as follows
Proposition 2 (1) When 4AB   2A  0 and 2 jAj
p
AB  4AB   BA; the NEs in
each region are
(1-1) When Fi=
2
i  14A2i ; the unique NE is (?;?).
(1-2) When 1
4A
2i  Fi=2i  BB22i; the unique NE is (Xi;).
(1-3) When Fi=
2
i  BB22i; the unique NE is (Xi; Xi).
(2) Otherwise, the NEs in each region are
(1-1) When Fi=
2
i  min[BB22i; AA22i]; the unique NE is (?;?).
(1-2) When min[BB
2
2i; AA
2
2i]  Fi=2i  14A2i ; there are two NEs: (Xi; Xi) or (?;?).
(1-3) When Fi=
2
i  14A2i ; the unique NE is (Xi; Xi).
Intuitively, it is highly possible that only rm A will use the variable in the equilibrium (Xi,
?) since the variable aects only its demand. However, there are many cases in which rm B
will also use variable Xi when rm A uses Xi: The intuition is that although Xi does not aect
rm B's demand directly, rm A's price will aect rm B's demand and hence its best response.
When rm A charges dierent prices in dierent markets, rm B may also benet from changing
its prices in each market accordingly, which is called information spillover eect in this paper.
When the xed cost is small enough, the benet from information spillover eect dominates and
hence rm B will also use that variable in the equilibrium.
3.4 Application: Vertical Dierentiation
There are two sellers A and B selling products with dierent quality levels, qA and qB; respectively
(qA > qB). For example, Firm A is Orbitz.com or Expedia.com who oers travel items at regular
prices whereas Firms B is Priceline.com or Hotwire.com who oers non-exible air, hotel, or
rental cars at discounted prices. Consider a simple case with two variables, X1 and X2. X1 is the
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frequency with which a customer traveled during the last year. X2 is the frequency with which a
customer used the discounted services provided by Firm B. The utility function of a buyer with
demographic values (x1, x2) to buy from each seller is assumed to be
UA = x1 + qA   pA;
UB = x1 + qB   pB;
where  models the heterogeneity of customers and is the marginal willingness-to-pay of unit
quality. Consistent with the literature,  is assumed to be uniformly distributed in [x2   12 ;
x2 +
1
2
]. In other words, x1 models the xed valuation of travel items provided by both rms
whereas x2 models the expected quality preference of customers in each market segment.
Assuming market is always not fully covered in all realizations of (x1, x2), the demand of
each seller is given by
DA = x2 +
1
2
  pA   pB
qA   qB ;
DB =
pA   pB
qA   qB  
pB   x1
qB
:
Compared with the baseline model, it follows that 1 = 0, 1 = 1=qB, 2 = 1, 2 = 0, and
A = B = A = 1=(qA   qB) = qBB=qA: For ease of comparison, assume F1=21 = F2=22:
Applying Proposition 2 leads to
Proposition 3 In this model, 4AB 2A  0 and 2 jAj
p
AB  4AB BA both holds.
The NEs regarding X1 in each region are
(1-1) When Fi=
2
i  (qA qB)4qAqB ; the unique NE is (?;?).
(1-2)When (qA qB)
4qAqB
 Fi=2i  (qA qB)(4qA qB)2 ; the unique NE is (; X1).
(1-3) When Fi=
2
i  (qA qB)(4qA qB)2 ; the unique NE is (X1; X1).
The NEs regarding X2 in each region are
(1-1) When Fi=
2
i  (qA qB)4 ; the unique NE is (?;?).
(1-2) When (qA qB)
4
 Fi=2i  (qA qB)qBqA(4qA qB)2 ; the unique NE is (X2;).
(1-3) When Fi=
2
i  (qA qB)qBqA(4qA qB)2 ; the unique NE is (X2; X2).
First, in the intermediate cases, the high quality rm A will use X2 and the low quality rm
B will use X1 in this model. This model suggests that when the pricing variable aects only the
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overall WTP, the lower quality rm has greater incentives to use it. When a pricing variable
aects the distribution of quality preferences, the higher quality rm has greater incentives to
use it. Second, when only rm A adopts X2; its VOPD is
(qA qB)
4
22: This term is increasing in
qA and decreasing in qB: When only rm B adopts X1; its VOPD is
(qA qB)
4qAqB
22: This term is also
increasing in qA and decreasing in qB: The intuition is that the value of price discrimination in this
case is determined by the size of the vertical dierentiation (qA   qB). The larger the dierence
is, the more dierentiation there is between two rms, and the value of price discrimination is
higher.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the properties of a prot-maximizing set of variables for third-degree price
discrimination. In the monopoly case, the seller should use pricing variables with high explana-
tory power of demand: variables with large demand coecients or high variance. In the duopoly
case, that criterion still applies but the value of price discrimination will be aected by compe-
tition, too. This model shows that when only one rm uses a pricing variable, the value of price
discrimination is the same as in the monopoly case. When both rms use a pricing variable,
the value of price discrimination is higher when two products are substitutes and that variable
aects demands in the same direction. In contrast, the value of price discrimination is lower
when two rms sell substitutes and that variable aects demands in the opposite direction.
Several related issues may require further analysis. First and foremost, the robustness of the
results under dierent demand curves assumptions. There are two directions to generalize the
demand functions: (1) letting pricing variables aect demand coecients; (2) nonlinear demand
curve. Both routes are important directions for future investigation but are beyond the scope
of this paper. Second, this study considers the case of third-degree price discrimination and ex-
cludes customer self-selection or arbitrage between market segments. A model that incorporates
these features is a multi-dimensional nonlinear pricing model, which is notoriously analytically
complicated. Lastly, this study assumes that no rm is competed out of any market segment.
Relaxing this assumption may lead to messy algebraic results and obfuscate the key insights pro-
vided by the current model. But, the gain would be an analysis of the entry and exit strategies
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of rms in each market segment.
5 Appendix: Proofs
5.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose the monopoly chooses to use x1;    ; xm for market segmentation and denote this vector
of variables by xA. The demand curve of this monopoly is given by
DA(xA; pA) = 0 +
mX
i=1
ixi +
NX
i=m+1
ii   ApA(xA):
The objective function is simply
A(xA) = DA(xA; pA) pA(xA):
The rst order condition yields
0 +
mX
i=1
ixi +
NX
i=m+1
ii   2ApA(xA) = 0:
The optimal price in the main text is derived after rearranging terms. The rst order condition
also implies
DA(xA; pA) = ApA(xA):
As a result, it follows that
A(xA) = Ap
2
A(xA) =
1
4A
"
A +
X
i2A
i(xi   i)
#2
:
Taking expectation on this term yields the result of this lemma.
5.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The rst order condition leads to
EX
i2AC [DA(x1;   xN ; pA; pB)]  ApA(xA) = 0: (5)
19
The rst term is simply the expected demand over the variables that are not used by rm A. I
use the subscript for expectations taking over Xi2AC . The set AC denotes the complement of set
A and thus is the set of variables not used by rm A. The expected demand and the FOC can
be rewritten as
0 +
X
i2A
ixi +
X
i2AC
ii   ApA(xA) + BEXi2AC [pB(xB)]  ApA(xA) = 0: (6)
Similarly, the rst order condition from rm B's prot optimization problem is given by
0 +
X
i2B
ixi +
X
i2BC
ii + AEXi2BC [pA(xA)]  2BpB(xB) = 0: (7)
Note that the expectations are eectively only on setBnA andAnB in two equations, respectively.
BnA means the set of variables used by rm B but not by rm A. In other words, both expected
price functions are functions of xA\B: The next step is to derive expected pricing functions of
xA\B. Taking expectations on both sides with respect to XAnB and XBnA and note that this step
does not aect the expected price functions; it follows that
0 +
X
i2A\B
ixi +
X
i2(A\B)C
ii + BEXi2AC [pB(xB)] = 2AEXi2BC [pA(xA)]
and
0 +
X
i2A\B
ixi +
X
i2(A\B)C
ii + AEXi2BC [pA(xA)] = 2BEXi2AC [pB(xB)] :
Equivalently, we can use A and B to simplify the LHS of these equations and it follows that
A +
X
i2A\B
i(xi   i) + BEXi2AC [pB(xB)] = 2AEXi2BC [pA(xA)]
and
B +
X
i2A\B
i(xi   i) + AEXi2BC [pA(xA)] = 2BEXi2AC [pB(xB)] :
Solving these two equations yields
EX
i2BC [pA(xA)] =
BB + 2BA +
P
i2A\B(Bi + 2Bi)(xi   i)
4AB   BA
;
EX
i2AC [pB(xB)] =
2AB + AA +
P
i2A\B(2Ai + Ai)(xi   i)
4AB   BA
:
After substituting these two expected prices in (6) and (7) and rearranging terms, we have
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pA(xA) =
1
2A
"
A +
X
i2A
i(xi   i) + B 
2AB + AA +
P
i2A\B(2Ai + Ai)(xi   i)
4AB   BA
#
;
pB(xB) =
1
2B
"
B +
X
i2B
i(xi   i) + A 
BB + 2BA +
P
i2A\B(Bi + 2Bi)(xi   i)
4AB   BA
#
:
This lemma establishes after rearranging terms.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
The rst order conditions lead to
EX
i2AC [DA(x1;   xN ; pA; pB)]  pA(xA) 
EX
i2AC [DA(x1;   xN jxA)]
@pA(xA)
= 0;
which is equivalent to
EX
i2AC [DA(x1;   xN ; pA; pB)] = ApA(xA):
Similarly,
EX
i2BC [DB(x1;   xN ; pA; pB)] = BpB(xB):
These equations show the equation between expected demand and product prices. Substituting
for the expected demands in the objective functions, it follows that
RA(xA) = A  pA(xA)2;
RB(xB) = B  pB(xB)2:
Note that only the squared terms (e.g.,E[(xi   i)2]) of pA(xA)2 will be nonzero because
E[(xi   i)] = 0 and E

(xi   i)(xj   j)

= 0;8i 6= j: The results of equilibrium revenue can be
established after taking expectation on RA(xA) and RB(xB); respectively.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 1
By Theorem 1, i = i; A = B; and B = A:Hence,
AA
2
2i = A
B + 2A
42A   2B
2
2i and BB
2
2i = B
2A + B
42A   2B
2
2i :
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By Table 1, it is straightforward to verify that (1) when AA
2
2i >
2i
4A
; then there are two
NEs: either (?;?) or (Xi; Xi) is an equilibrium; (2) otherwise, there are two other NEs: either
(?; Xi) or (Xi;?) is an equilibrium. The proof of this claim is as follows:
AA
2
2i >
2i
4A
if and only if
A
B + 2A
42A   2B
2
2i  
2i
4A
> 0;
which can be simplied to 8<:
(4A B)B2i
4(2A B)2A > 0; if i = i
  (4A+B)B2i
4(B+2A)A
> 0; if i =  i
Since A > 0 and A  B; it follows that8<: B > 0; if i = iB < 0; if i =  i
This establishes the proposition.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 2
To characterize the equilibrium variables selection, we need to nd the orderings of the following
four revenues: AA
2
2i
2
i ;
2i
4A
2i ; BB
2
2i
2
i ; and
2i
4B
2i : Note that by assumption, i = 0: Since all
other numbers are positive in this case, we only need to compare the other three variables.
(1) AA
2
2i
2
i  BB22i2i if and only if
AA
2
2i   BB22i  0
,
 
4AB   2A

B
2
i
(4AB   BA)2
 0
,  4AB   2A  0: (8)
(2) AA
2
2i
2
i  
2
i
4A
2i if and only if
AA
2
2i  
2i
4A
 0
, (8AB   BA)BA
2
i
4 (4AB   BA)2 A
 0
, BA  0;
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where the last inequality results from 8AB   BA > AB   BA  0: BA  0 is always
true by assumption.
(3) BB
2
2i
2
i  
2
i
4A
2i if and only if
BB
2
2i  
2i
4A
 0
,  
 
162A
2
B   4A2AB   8ABAB + 2B2A

2i
4 (4AB   BA)2 A
 0
,    162A2B   8ABAB + 2B2A   4A2AB  0:
, 4A2AB  (4AB   BA)2 :
, 2 jAj
p
AB  4AB   BA: (9)
As a result, 8 and 9 determine the orderings of the revenues. Once the ordering is determined,
the equilibrium can be derived by Table 1. The three cases are: (1) When 4AB   2A  0 and
2 jAj
p
AB  4AB   BA; it can be veried that AA22i  14A2i  BB22i  14B
2
i : (2)
When 4AB   2A  0 and 2 jAj
p
AB  4AB   BA; it can be veried that AA22i 
BB
2
2i  14A2i  14B
2
i : (3) When 4AB   2A  0 it can be veried that BB22i  AA22i 
1
4A
2i  14B 
2
i : (2) and (3) leads to the second result in the proposition.
5.6 Proof of Proposition 3
First, we need to check the conditions in Proposition 2. It is straightforward to verify that
4AB   2A  0 , 4 qAqB2A   2A  0: Next, 2 jAj
p
AB  4AB   BA , 22A
q
qA
qB

4 qA
qB
2A 2A: By 2
q
qA
qB
 3 qA
qB
, 2
3
< 1 
q
qA
qB
; it follows that 22A
q
qA
qB
 3 qA
qB
2A < 4
qA
qB
2A 2A:
By substituting exogenous parameters, the critical values of revenues can be derived as follows
22
4A
=
(qA   qB)
4
;
21
4B
=
(qA   qB)
4qAqB
;
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AA
2
21 = A

B1
4AB   BA
2
=
(qA   qB)
(4qA   qB)2
;
BB
2
21 = B

2A1
4AB   BA
2
=
4 (qA   qB) qA
(4qA   qB)2 qB
;
AA
2
22 = A

2Bi
4AB   BA
2
=
4 (qA   qB) q2A
(4qA   qB)2
;
BB
2
22 = B

Ai
4AB   BA
2
=
(qA   qB) qBqA
(4qA   qB)2
:
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